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Beyond Literacy: A Response to Tom
Ginsburg's An Economic Interpretationof the
Pashtunwali
Lesley Wexlert

INTRODUCTION
After mapping out an insightful political economy of the
Pashtunwali, Tom Ginsburg asks if the West can meaningfully
engage the Pashtun through this non-state-based legal code. He
encourages such engagement as a tool to both reduce violence
within and across Pashtun tribes and to improve the treatment
of women within the Pashtun society. In so doing, Ginsburg poses a very important question about the West's strategy for approaching Pashtun governance. While some scholars suggest the
goal of legalizing the Afghan state is a compelling reason for substantial "continued Western presence"' and Western policy makers have made the expansion of the state into Pashtun areas "a
pillar of the international strategy in Afghanistan,"2 the Pashtunwali, rather than the state, continues to govern millions of
Pashtun in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 3 In contrast to these
aforementioned scholars and policy makers, Ginsburg calls for

t Professor of Law, Thomas M. Mengler Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Christina Thacker and Clare Willis for excellent research assistance. Many thanks also to Tom Ginsburg, Arden Rowell, Dan Shalmon, Nina Tarr, Tom
Ulen, and Cynthia Williams for comments and suggestions.
1 Tom Ginsburg, An Economic Interpretationof the Pashtunwali,2011 U Chi Legal
F 89, 90 (noting that some believe that the West needs an active presence to help expand
the legal control of the Afghan state into Pashtun areas).
2 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understandingthe Pakistan-AfghanistanFrontier,32 Intl Sec 41, 54 (2008), citing Afghanistan
on the Brink: Where Do We Go from Here?, Hearing before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (2007) (testimony of Lt Gen David W. Barno, US
Army (ret)), online at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/bar021507.htm (visited Sept 9,
2011); Ann Scott Tyson, General: No US. Troop Cuts in Afghanistan This Year, Seattle
Times (Sept 22, 2006), online at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/
2003270419_troops22.htnl (visited Sept 9, 2011).
3 See Ginsburg, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 89-90 (cited in note 1). This is in contrast to
other sources such as the state law of Afghanistan or Pakistan, or sharia.
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the retention and reinforcement of the jirg84 as a local institution to resolve disputes and issue decisions in accordance with
the Pashtunwali.5 History seems to be on Ginsburg's side as to
the benefits of accepting existing legal structures in Pashtun areas,6 but I want to focus on the difficulties and unintended consequences of Ginsburg's complementary suggestion that the West
promote literacy and education in this area. He contends that
literacy and, in particular, its role in creating written jirga opinions, may serve as a mechanism to facilitate clearer substantive
legal norms within the Pashtunwali and thus reduce the potential for future disputes. He also tentatively suggests that literacy
programs might improve Pashtun women's quality of life in a
variety of ways. First, it might reduce the occurrence of disagreements in which women may be bartered as a conflictresolution mechanism. Second, literacy may hasten general economic prosperity, which often brings accompanying benefits for
women and can provide them the means to improve their position within the community. Finally, literacy may allow the introduction of new, more female-friendly ideas into the general culture and, more specifically, into the Pashtunwali itself.
This response, however, introduces some significant limitations that Ginsburg's literacy proposal faces in achieving its dual
aims of reducing violence and improving the treatment of women. In brief, as to be discussed in more detail in Part I, without a
simultaneous source of and motivation for norm change, literacy
may not ameliorate the root causes of disputes. More worrisomely, attempts to promote literacy may ratchet up violence. One
possibility is that the Pashtun will use written precedents to
harmonize the punishments within the legal system, and in so
doing embrace the harshest penalties for norm violations. In addition, such efforts may draw the ire of the Pashtun, the Taliban,
4 See id at 97 (cited in note 1) (defining the firga as "[a] central institution in village
life ... an institution common to central Asian tribes that consists of a public meeting of
the notables of the community.... [Jirgasare more common at local levels where they
decide disputes. Jirgas are formed by local notables, who are neither elected nor appointed but are seen as having the wisdom and knowledge necessary to resolve disputes.").
5 See generally id at 97-98 (cited in note 1).
6 Past British efforts to work with the Baluchi Jlrgasavoided the ire of local insurgencies during the colonial period while attempts by the Pakistani government to install
top-down governance structures were met with much resistance and bloodshed. Johnson
and Mason, 32 Intl Sec at 49 (cited in note 2). See also John H. Cathell, Human Geography in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region: Undermining the Taliban Using Traditional
PashtunSocial Structures,Report for Joint Military Operations Dept, Naval War College
1, 19-21 (May 2009) (recommending respect for Pashtunwali and engagement with jirga
process).
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al-Qaeda, and the Pakistani government if they perceive such
Western-led literacy programs as threats to their control. Relatedly, literacy programs can also stoke violence when they engender rising expectations for their beneficiaries without any concomitant economic improvements to satisfy them. Lastly, literacy
alone seems unlikely to enhance the status or treatment of women because nothing about literacy inherently undermines the
structure of the honor culture that promotes women's subjugation and places them at great risk of violence. That being said, as
I will explain in Part II, history suggests that the coupling of literacy with a bottom-up push for norm change may transcend
these limitations and make progress toward the goals of reducing
violence and changing conditions for Pashtun women.
I. LIMITATIONS

Literacy and, in particular, the movement toward a written
culture of dispute resolution may not reduce violence among the
Pashtun. Before I explain why, it is important to first understand the various reasons that conflict emerges in communities
currently governed by the Pashtunwali (which is generally administered and enforced by the mostly illiterate community
jirgas). Ginsburg himself identifies multiple pathways for conflict
escalation. One involves the coordination of Pashtun behavior in
Hawk-Dove situations. When such conditions arise, people are
uncertain as to whether their own aggressive behavior will elicit
an undesirable aggressive response or a desirable passive response.7 Miscalculation can exacerbate the underlying dispute.
Other pathways involve the ambiguity in either the content of
the underlying behavioral norms or, relatedly, disagreements
about the necessary conditions to trigger the underlying norm
violations. The entrenchment of the jirga, without literacy, seems
sufficient to address much of the potential for Hawk-Dove situations to escalate. Even without written precedents, oral cultures
can convey the content of norm violations; the likelihood that
violators will be punished; and the range of possible sanctions. Of
7 Ginsburg, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 94 (cited in note 1) (describing the Hawk-Dove
game as one in which "Hawk represents the aggressive strategy, while Dove represents
the passive strategy. Each player would prefer to play Hawk to the other's Dove. If both
players play the aggressive Hawk strategy, however, a fight ensues. On the other hand, if
both play the passive Dove strategy, neither gets the property, which is suboptimal from
a social perspective. Each player's preference ordering is such that he wishes to coordinate with the other party, so as to avoid a costly fight, but the parties disagree over how
to coordinate their behavior.").
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course, as Ginsburg notes, the jirgas cannot prevent the emergence of "strong players [that] will not be sure whom to prey on
and may make a mistake," thus triggering a dispute." But before
making a decision about their behavior, even strong players
should currently expect that the community will support those
who comply with existing norms and will fail to aid those who do
not comply with either the Pashtunwali's norms or the jirga's
ordered resolution to such a violation. This expectation increases
the strong player's incentive to take care in initiating a conflict.
Moreover, it is not clear how literacy would decrease the
"weak['s] ... incentive to signal that [he] will fight," which arises

in a Hawk-Dove situation in which the weak player hopes such a
signal will encourage the stronger player to play the dove.
It bears mentioning that empirical evidence suggests the existing jirgascurrently do pretty well at maintaining order once a
dispute has arisen-at least one estimate suggests they resolve
about 95 percent of the cases that come before them.9 Thus,
Ginsburg's point that a stable jirga using the Pashtunwali may
do better at resolving these situations than either the promotion
of a more liberal democratic judiciary that the Pashtun are loath
to participate in or the use of mullahs and sharia is well taken.
My point is merely to suggest that his literacy reforms seem unlikely to substantially dampen the potential for these specific
situations to arise or escalate beyond the status quo.
Literacy may, however, help to resolve ambiguities in underlying norms and clarify the specific sanctions corresponding to
different violations. Yet the burden is on Ginsburg to demonstrate that norm ambiguity is what generally drives violence in
Pashtun communities, as opposed to either calculated risk to
gain status or miscalculations about the likelihood of normviolation detection. The ambiguity account is certainly plausible,
but without significant data, we might worry that unifying and
hardening underlying substantive norms could create new problems without addressing the root causes of violence and subjugation of women. Moreover, while Ginsburg seems concerned that
"[tlhe actual substantive norms that are applied may differ from
place to place,"1 0 without simultaneous norm change, literacy
runs the risk of codifying and entrenching the least progressive
practices. Take, for instance, the pressure for reduced judicial
8

Id at 97 (cited in note 1).
9 See Honour among Them, The Economist (Dec 19, 2006) online at http://www.econ
omist.com/node/8345531?story-id=8345531 (visited Sept 9, 2011).
10 Ginsburg, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 100 (cited in note 1).
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discretion and enhanced harmonization in domestic federal criminal sentencing. The resulting codification, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, has provoked a continual ratcheting up of
sentences." Such unification and lack of judicial discretion would
have been difficult to achieve in the absence of written guidelines. In the abstract, uniformity could have also created a lever
in favor of generally reducing, rather than increasing, sentences.
Yet within our political culture, politicians feel they can gain only by creating new crimes and raising sentences; countervailing
political pressure has continually failed to effectively challenge
the direction of criminal sentences in the United States.12 One
might worry that jirgas searching through written precedents
about the content of norms relating to substantive violations of
the Pashtunwali or about appropriate private sanctions for such
violations will find themselves in a similar position and thus be
most likely to adopt the harshest interpretations and support the
most punitive outcomes. Such an outcome is not inevitable, but
mere access to written opinions provides no reason for jirgas to
choose less violent or more female-friendly options. That impetus
must come from some other mechanism or norm. Otherwise, this
new access to opinions might lead to a harmonization across
jirgas that provides clarity and thus prevents ambiguity-driven
conflicts and promotes quicker resolution, but the harmonization
might also simultaneously expand the content and ratchet up the
consequences of honor violations.
Second, the promotion of literacy could itself create tension
and violence. At first blush, literacy appears to be an unadulterated good that provides access to knowledge and new ideas 3 and
11 See, for example, Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich, Federal Sentencing Survey:
Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairnessin FederalSentencing, 85 Denver U L Rev
51, 54 (2007) (describing the United States Sentencing Commission's process of creating
guidelines as a "one-way ratchet" that increased sentences); Nancy J. King, Judicial
Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of BargainedPunishment, 58 Stan L Rev
293, 301 (2005) (describing congressional adjustments to federal sentencing rules as a
one-way ratchet").
12 See Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 Am U L Rev 703, 719
(2005). See also Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J Crim L
& Criminol 1293, 1349 (2006); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal
Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 507 (2001) (arguing that "all change in criminal law seems to
push in the same direction-toward more liability"). But see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy
and Decriminalization,86 Tex L Rev 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that "[tihe ratchet of crime
legislation turns both ways" and describing ongoing legislative efforts to decriminalize
behavior).
13 "[O]ne of the most remarkable features of America" is the "universal and sincere
faith that they profess here in the efficaciousness of education." A. Bartlett Giamatti, A
Free and OrderedSpace: The Real World of the University33 (W. W. Norton & Company
1988), quoting G. W. Pierson, Tocqueville in America 294 (Doubleday 1959).
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simultaneously reduces social isolation as students learn about
the outside world. But if students learn to read from primers
promoting aggression, they are likely to embrace violence-based
norms.14 Past experience provides an important warning, as both
Afghanistan and Pakistan have a long history of using primary
school textbooks that glorified violence and martyrdom. 5 Similarly, many of the madrassas across the Muslim world also
demonstrate education's potential for radicalizing populations. 6
While Ginsburg likely assumes that the West would promote literacy within a package of progressive education, historical evidence shows that American involvement does not preclude, and
may even hasten, the use of conflict-ennobling textbooks.1 7 In
fact, as recently as 2002, USAID printed books for an Afghanistan Back-to-School Campaign that contained religious references that "instructed true believers to kill all non-Muslims."18
Third, Western efforts to educate the Pashtun will face significant resistance from the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
government, and perhaps the Pashtun themselves. This region
has a lengthy tradition of backlash against outsider efforts to
lead educational reform. For instance, in the 1970s, the Pashtun
destroyed Soviet-sponsored schools that were thought to threaten
Afghan culture and values.' 9 More recently, Al Qaeda and other
forces have targeted schools, and especially those that educate
girls. In fact, in 2007, these forces destroyed an "average of more
than one [Afghan] girls' school a day."2 0 Areas of Western Paki14 Jeaniene Spink, Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an
Education System in Peacebuildingand Reconstruction, 2 J Peace Educ 195, 203-05
(2007); Jeaniene Spink, Education, Reconstruction, and State Building in Afghanistan,
Forced Migration Rev 1, 2 (2009) online at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/Education
Supplement/09.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011) (noting that literacy programs cannot succeed
when textbooks continue to extol violence).
15 Craig Davis, "A "is for Allah, "I"is for Jihad,19 World Pol J 90, 91-93 (2002).
16 International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrassas,Extremism, and the Military 2
(July 29, 2002) (discussing their role in fomenting religious extremism); 9/11 Commission,
The 9/11 Commission Report: FinalReport of the National Commission on TerrristAttacks Upon the United States,online at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 1/ at sec 12.2. (visited Sept 9, 2011); Robert W. Hefner, Islam and Asian Security, in Strategic Asia 2002-03:
Asian Aftershocks 352-53, 360, 368 (National Bureau of Asian Research 2003) (Richard
J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds).
17 Davis, 19 World Pol J at 93 (cited in note 15). This includes textbooks underwritten
by US grants in the late 1980s which "developed exercises around the number of dead
and alive Russians." Spink, 2 J Peace Educ at 199 (cited in note 14). The Taliban then
reissued these books in the 2000s.
1s Spink, 2 J Peace Educ at 201 (cited in note 14).
19 Id at 197.

20 The "Taliban [also] burned down 1,089 [schools] from 2005 to 2007." Johnson and
Mason, 32 Intl Sec at 65 (cited in note 2), citing Jason Straziuso, Bush Ignores Afghan
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stan face similar threats with few qualified instructors willing to
teach in threatened areas. 21 While progressive social change is
often presaged or accompanied by violence, it is worth noting
that if this rate of destructiveness continues, the West simply
could not build, replace, or repair schools quickly enough to produce any benefit at all. This problem seems particularly intractable if the United States is unwilling to provide the military or
police support necessary to protect such schools. 22 To be clear, I
am not suggesting that such interventions are per se undesirable, but Ginsburg's implicit suggestion that literacy is a way of
successfully and cheaply achieving Western goals without being
embedded in a larger package of Western involvement is perhaps
naive.
Relatedly, the Pakistani government may resent and perhaps even block wide-scale efforts to work outside of their officially sanctioned school system. 23 Given the United States's past
role in bankrolling mujahideen education, the Pakistani government is likely to be particularly wary of US efforts to engage the
Pashtun through non-state-based education. 24 In addition, outside influence might create or harden Pashtun resistance to what
might otherwise be a palatable approach. After generations of
School Violence, Seattle Times (Jan 30, 2008), online at http://seattletimes.nw
source.com/html/nationworld/2004153478_apafghanschools3O.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
21 See Human Rights Watch, Their Future Is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and
Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province, Pakistan 1, 1-3 (Dec 2010), online at
http://www.hrw.org/node/94653 (visited Sept 9, 2011) (noting that "[airmed Islamist
militants have increasingly committed violence in opposition to the content and manner
of local education, particularly that of girls and young women").
22 See Human Rights Watch, Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, 18 Afghanistan 1, 109 (July 2006), online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/
afghanistanO706/index.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011). One could easily argue that the United
States should simply provide both schools and security, but it is worth remembering that
the cost of putting one soldier in Afghanistan for one year is over $500,000. See Great
Sacrifices, Small Rewards: Has America's Obsession with This Region Been Worth It?
The Economist (Jan 1, 2011), online at httpV/www.economist.conVnode/17797714 (visited
May 4, 2011). Moreover, even a massive increase in the US presence may not reduce the
amount of violence directed at civilians. See generally Christian Davenport and Molly
Inman, The Puzzle of IraqiMortality: Surges, Civilian Deaths andAlternative Meanings,
61 Yale J Intl Aff 57 (2010).
23 See generally Andrew Coulson, Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim
World: Is There a Problem? What Can We Do about It? (Cato Institute 2004), online at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011). The reader should keep in
mind that the United States has currently pledged support for Pakistan's Education
Sector Reform strategy, which relies on the expansion of state schools. See id at 19. While
education need not occur outside the state system, it seems at odds with the tone of Ginsburg's piece, which suggests the Afghan and Pakistan state stay out of governing these
areas and that literacy would be an alternative approach to expanding the government's
reach.
24 Id at 16-19.
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oppression and colonization, the Pashtun are wary not only of
their own state but states in general. 25 In particular, their experiences during the post- 9/11 counterinsurgency may have heightened their significant suspicion of the West.2 6
Finally, literacy, without accompanying economic improvements, may engender the sort of deep-seated dissatisfaction that
culminates in new outbreaks of violence. 27 Given their relatively
limited exposure to the outside world, the Pashtun mostly lack
the rising expectations that are usually present in people's revolutions. 28 In other words, as a general matter, the Pashtun generally accept their economic lot because they do not expect any
better. Enhanced literacy, however, might spawn widespread
discontent as it provides young men with greater skills and
greater knowledge about the outside world without providing
meaningful opportunities for improvement in their economic situation. Even if literacy stabilizes and reinforces the jirga and
legal mechanisms for dispute resolution, without other mechanisms for economic improvement, literacy will not, by itself, improve the economic position of the Pashtun.2 9 Even if literacy
does improve the economic lot of the Pashtun generally, it may
not necessarily herald better treatment or status for women.30 If
25 Anthony Hyman, Nationalism in Afghanistan, 34 J Middle East Stud 299, 312
(2002) (describing wariness of their own state after non-Pashtun elements took over the
national government); id at 303-04 (describing Aghan nationalism as rooted in opposition
to British involvement).
26 Robert Blackwill, PlanB in Afghanistan: Why a de facto PartitionIs the Least Bad
Option, 90 For Affs 42, 42-43 (Jan/Feb 2011).
27 See generally Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton 1970) (describing problem when conditions are constant but aspirations soar due to factors such as education or
exposure to more fortunate groups).
28 See Johnson and Mason, 32 Intl See at 55 (cited in note 2), citing Eric R. Wolf,
PeasantWars of the Twentieth Century 166-75 (Harper & Row 1969).
29 See Coulson, Education and Indoctrinationat 26-27 (cited in note 23). See generally Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed(Herder and Herder 1970) (challenging the
notion that literacy always leads to social and economic advancement and observing that
the importance of the context in which it is embedded). Even in the United States and
Canada, some evidence suggests literacy does not positively determine economic possibilities. See Harvey J. Graff, The Labyrinths of Literacy: Reflections on Literacy Past and
Present73-89 (Falmer 1987).
30 For instance, in discussing Indian education programs, Professor Marion den Uyl
observed, "The content of education is not to make critical choices. It has only one goal: to
be dutiful and to be married. It is about repetition and not to think. Education doesn't
allow the women to think that the anything is possible in the world." Literacy Does Not
Improve Status of Women, The Hindu (Jan 5, 2003) online at http://hindu.com/
2003/01/05/stories/2003010502590700.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011) (discussing the coexistence of high wealth and education which subjugates women); Siwan Anderson, Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but are Rising in India, 111 J Poli
Econ 269, 294 (2003) (concluding that economic growth in non-caste societies will cause
dowries to decline while economic growth in caste societies will increase the practice and
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women continue to be viewed as tradeable commodities, economic growth may merely change the number of women required for
an exchange to resolve a dispute rather than eliminate the root
cause of disputes or the mechanism by which they are settled.
Similar caution is warranted for the claim that the strengthening of the jirga and the introduction of literacy may improve
conditions for Pashtun women and girls. Jirgasonly rarely allow
female participation 31 and most decisions govern relationships
between men. 3 2 Ginsburg seems to argue that literacy and education could change the nature of the jirga by allowing greater participation by and enhanced respect for women. Yet Ginsburg is
quite aware of and sensitive to the limitations and difficulties of
providing women access to education in this context 33 as well as
the problems created by providing only men literacy skills. The
problems of disparate literacy attainment could include the entrenchment and worsened subjugation of women if men refuse to
share literacy's benefits. In order for literacy to improve women's
condition through any of the pathways Ginsburg identifies, the
Pashtun need a simultaneous norm shift that literacy can reinforce, accelerate, and disseminate. In particular, the content of
the Pashtunwali's code of honor needs a substantial overhaul.
Under the current Pashtun conception of honor, men and women
have inherently different capacities. Men can both enhance and
degrade their families' honor. 34 In contrast, the actions (or inaction) of women tends only to maintain the status quo or to bring
dishonor to the family; in particular, women can do little outside
their home or regarding their chastity to enhance their families'
honor. 35 For instance, a woman who is raped creates a loss of
amount of dowries).
31 See Jonathan Hawkins, The Pashtun CulturalCode: Pashtunwali,180 Australian
Defence Force J 16, 21 (2009).
32 Palwasha Kakar, TribalLaw of Pashtunwaliand Women's Legislative Authority 6
(2002), online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programsfilsp/research/kakar.pdf (visited
Sept 9, 2011) (noting that the only time a woman's fate is decided at such a council is
when "her marriage is made a part of the solution to a conflict").
33 See Ginsburg, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 108 (cited in note 1).
34 Ginsburg rightly notes that "[clertain actions are seen as helping to build honor,
while others are seen as hurting it." Ginsburg, 2011 U Chi Legal F at 96 (cited in note 1).
See Dov Cohen and Jospeh A. Vandello, Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts that PerpetuateDomestic Violence, 84 J Personality. & Soc Psych 997, 998
(2003) (noting that women who marry up the chain can enhance their families' status, but
all of the ways they can increase status are determined within patriarchal arrangements); Janet Signal and Maureen Nally, Cultural Perspectives on Gender, 27, 29 in
PraegerGuide to the Psychology of Gender(Praeger 2004) (Michele A. Paulidi, ed).
3 See Kakar, Thbal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority at 8
(cited in note 32) (explaining why, "[ihf a woman earns a bad reputation, her whole family,

124

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

honor for her family, but a woman who successfully maintains
her chastity or otherwise acts consistently with prevailing sexual
norms does not increase her family's honor.36
All that being said, I do not mean to be too pessimistic. Despite the Pashtun's well-earned reputation for violence, such
practices are not inevitable. Achieving greater order without violence and other norm change among the Pashtun is quite difficult, but I raise these limitations to Ginsburg's suggestion merely as a cautionary note to suggest that any literacy program
needs to incorporate content consistent with the desired outcome
and, more ambitiously, to be accompanied by mechanisms or
norm changes designed to dampen these potential sources of conflict and oppression.
II. TRANSCENDENCE

The questions raised by Pashtun violence and subjugation of
women have been asked and answered in many other historical
contexts. 37 How does systemic violence end? What allows the
progressive reform of an honor culture steeped in the repression
of women? Some of the answers rely on aggressive and efficacious outside intervention, such as when the state dismantles
organized crime units like mobs and gangs. 38 Since widespread
resistance to the project of state building among the Pashtun is
part of the underlying problem, aggressive and efficacious state
intervention to criminalize and enforce punishments for violence
and maltreatment of women is an unworkable option for the
short term and perhaps the long term as well. While exposure to
different social arrangements can stimulate indigenous desire for
change, the Pashtun's long-standing suspicion of outsiderS39 likewhich includes the men, is sullied").
36 For instance, some honor cultures are based on the belief that "women cannot be
trusted to protect their chastity in the best interests of patriarchal society ... an honorable man is someone whose women kin remain chaste." Tahire Koptiirk, A Matter ofHonor: Experience of Turkish Women Immigants 56 (Zed Books 1992).
3 See, for example, Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, The Culture of Honor: The
Psychology of Violence in the South (Westview 1996).
38 James B. Jacobs and Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter., 25
Crime and Justice 129 (1999) (suggesting surveillance and long-term campaigns can
successfully eradicate gangs). But see Curtis J. Milhaup and Mark D. West, The Dark
Side of PrivateOrdering:An InstitutionalandEmpiricalAnalysis of OrganizedCrime, 67
U Chi L Rev 41, 45 (suggesting that altering institutional incentive structures and introducing additional rights enforcement agendas is a better strategy to eliminate organized
criminal activity).
3 George Kruys, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Afghanistan and the Role of
Pakistan, 31 Strategic Rev 97, 103 (2009). See also Spink, 2 J Peace Educ 195 at 197
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ly renders direct promotion of these alternative visions incapable
of displacing existing social structures and norms. Relatedly,
economic growth sometimes helps groups grow out of violence 40
and can provide women with more economic and social opportunities, as it did for some in Southern India.4 1 More immediately,
economic growth could provide resources for nonviolent settlement of Pashtun disputes without the subjugation of women. But
economic growth alone, like literacy, does not necessarily provide
an underlying reason to move away from existing societal
norms.42 If the Pashtun believe that trading women to other families strengthens ties and dampens the potential for conflict to
reemerge, economic growth may do little to change that practice.
Similarly, if the Pashtun remain rooted in the existing honor culture, additional resources could simply exacerbate pressures on
women as they did for dowry deaths in India.43
Rather, as with footbinding in China 44 and female genital
mutilation in parts of Africa, 45 I suggest that foreign efforts to
improve conditions on the ground need to be accompanied by the
emergence of internal norm entrepreneurs who can link changes
to existing cultural understandings and social structures. In both
the foothinding example and female genital mutilation cases,
although outsiders provided encouragement for more femalefriendly practices, leaders embedded within these communities
provided most of the impetus for change. 46 By supporting jirgas
and encouraging education, the hope is that the West may provide room for such indigenous reformers to emerge. In fact, liter-

(cited in note 14) (discussing Afghan communities who chased out teachers who were
perceived as threatening Afghan values and culture).
40 Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A RationalAction Approach, 34 J Conflict Resol 624, 644 (1990).
41 Nancy Luke and Kaivan Munshi, Women as Agents of Change, Female Income and
Mobility in Developing Countries,94 J Devel Econ 1, 1 (2011).
42 Emily Hannum and Claudia Buchmann, Global EducationalExpansion and SocioEconomic Development: An Assessment of Findings from the Social Sciences, 33 World
Dev 333, 340 (2004) (noting that greater female education often fails to increase access to
employment when sexist cultural norms remain embedded in the society).

43

44

See note 30.

See generally Lesley Wexler, Allowing Girls to Hold Up Half the Sky: Combining
Norm Promotion and Economic Incentives to Combat DaughterDiscrimination in China,
7 Chi J Intl L 79, 102-03 (2006).
45 Female "Circumcision"in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change 51 (2000)
(Bettina Shell Duncan and Ylva Hernlund, eds).
46 Wexler, 7 Chi J Intl L at 86-87 (cited in note 44); Female "Circumcision"inAfrica
at 51 (cited in note 45). See also Ellen Gruenbaum, Is Female "Circumcision"aMaladaptive Cultural Pattern?,in Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund, eds, Female "Circumcision"in Africa: Culture, Controversy,and Change 41 (Lynne Rienner 2000).
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acy-and education more generally-can and has improved the
lot of the Pashtun when tied to indigenous ideas for progressive
norm change. For instance, in the 1920s through the 1940s, Abdul Ghaffar Khan developed nonviolent strategies that improved
the position of women, reduced intra-Pashtun violence, and challenged British occupation. Khan viewed education as "an instrument for his social reforms," 47 which led him to set up
schools, 48 to embrace the retention of the Pashtun language, and
to start the first Pashtun political journal, 49 which openly challenged the Pashtun suppression of women.50 Relatedly, Khan's
literacy programs included women,5 1 and he recognized that
their position in the family made them uniquely well suited to
promote literacy for their children. 52
In tandem with education promotion, Khan also organized
the Servants of God, also known as the Red Shirts,5 3 to achieve
social and political reforms. 54 This group was composed of individuals who, "consistent with their code of honor and Muslim
beliefs,"55 swore "before God to give their lives for their people"56
and committed themselves to "using only nonviolent action to
achieve political, social and economic reforms."57 Part of their
oath obligated the Servants of God to "refrain from violence and
from taking revenge,"5 8 and contained a promise to abstain "from

47 Khurshed Alam Khan, Some Significant Aspects ofBadshah Khan's Life, in Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan: A Centennial Tribute 22, 27 (Har-Anand Publications 1995). Notably, Abdul Ghaffar Khan braved the stiff opposition of local mullahs to receive his early
education in Western missionary school. See Girdhari Lal Puri, Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan: A True Servant ofiumanity6-7 (Congress Centenary 1985).
48 See Eknath Easwaran, A Man to Match His Mountains: Badshah Khan, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam 77 (Nilgiri 1984).
49 See Rajmohan Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns 77-78
(Penguin Viking 2004); Attar Chand, India, Pakistan,and Afghanistan: A Study of Freedom Struggle and Abdul GhaffarKhan 38-40 (Commonwealth 1989).
5o See Easwaran, A Man to Match HisMountains at 105 (cited in note 48).
5' See Syed Sikander Mehdi, Building Nonkilling Muslim Societies: Relevance of
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, in Glenn D. Paige and Joam Evans Pim, eds, Global Nonkilling
Leadership Forum Book ofProceedings221, 223 (Center for Global Nonviolence 2008).
52 See Chand, India, PakistanandAfghanistan at 74-75 (cited in note 49).
53 Id at 49-50.
54 See Robert C. Johansen, RadicalIslam and Nonviolence:A Case Study ofReligious
Empowerment and Constraintamong Pashtuns,34 J Peace Res 53, 58 (1997).
55 Id.
56 S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Religion, Violence, and the Islamic Tradition of Non
Violence, 34 Turkish Yearbook of Intl L 23, 58 (2003).
57 Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative PoliticalTheory 153 (Lexington Books 1999).
58 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle 97 (Orient 1969).

115]

BEYOND LITERACY

127

taking part in feuds and quarrels and from creating enmity."5 9
While the vast majority of Servants of God were religious Muslims, Khan presented an inclusive vision of Islam and created a
nonsectarian movement which acted to protect Sikhs and Hindus
as well as Muslims. 60 Khan coupled this commitment to nonviolence with a larger project to emancipate women and promote
more equitable land distribution. 61
Khan's succeSS 6 2 in challenging destructive Pashtun practices derived at least partially from his understanding of the Pashtun religion, tradition, and social structures. 63 He used deeply
held religious ideas to teach nonviolence, such as suggesting that
a particular hadith (a report of what "Muhammad said, did, or
tacitly approved")64 indicated the superiority of nonviolence and
disapproved of violence.65 Khan also emphasized that "God
makes no distinction between men and women" and, thus, their
equality should follow part and parcel with independence.6 6 In
this way, Khan led a cultural reversal by using traditional symbols, ideas, and concepts to promote new patterns of behavior
and reject old patterns as inconsistent with deeply held beliefs.6 7
He also "blend[ed] the notion of absolute nonviolent discipline
with the traditional value of personal courage."6 8 The use of
oaths to bind the Servants of God to nonviolence was particularly
valuable because the honor culture dictates that, "once given, a

5 Id.
60 See Johansen, 34 J Peace Res at 70 n 23 (cited in note 54).
61 Anila Daulatzai, A Leap ofFaith: Thoughts on SecularisticPracticesand Progressive Politics,56 Intl Soc Sci J 565, 573 (2004).
62 The transformation was a swift one, with Khan's message taking root within a
decade. See Muhammad Soaleh Korejo, The FrontierGandhi: His Place in History 49
(Oxford 1993). Estimates of the membership range from 100,000 to 300,000. Johansen, 34
J Peace Res at 70 n 17 (cited in note 54). In terms of concrete achievements, the Red
Shirts are credited with influencing the British to provide the frontier full parity with
other provinces. See Brad Bennett, Arab-Muslim Cases ofNonviolent Struggle in Ralph
F. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim, eds, Arab Nonviolent PoliticalStruggle in
the Middle East41, 44 (Lynne Rienner 1990).
63 Khan rejected the spirit of vengeance that informed the code of honor and the
harmful customs and litigations which he felt kept the Pashtun from realizing their potential. See Chand, India, Pakistan andAfghanistan at 246-62 (cited in note 49).
64 Scott C. Lucas, Major Topics of the Hadith, 2 Religion Compass 226, 226 (2008).
65 See Kadayifici-Orellana, 34 Turkish Yearbook of Intl L at 52-53 (cited in note 56).
66 Dinanath G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith Is a Battle 101-02 (Gandhi
Peace Foundation 1967).
67 See Johansen, 34 J Peace Res at 66 (cited in note 54).
68 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The
Dynamics ofPeople Powerin the Twentieth Century 175 (Praeger 1994).
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[Pashtun]'s word cannot be broken"6 9 and the Pashtun must honor an oath with their lives. 70
Khan's organizing principles also bear out Ginsburg's intuition that the jirgas can act as a site for progressive change. In
assembling and directing the Servants of God, Khan capitalized
on existing structures, using jirgas to organize the members at
the local level7n and act as an unofficial parliament. 72 Khan's success suggests the very real possibility of blending a familiar legal
system and deeply held notions of discipline and courage with a
radically new approach to embodying and implementing an honor culture.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, Ginsburg's suggestion to work within the existing
Pashtun legal code and legal system is an appealing one. But in
order to reform the consequences of a strictly-enforced honor
code, one needs both tools and ideas for norm changes. Ginsburg
suggests particular tools such as the jirga and literacy, whereas I
want to encourage more careful attention to the ideas that those
tools are used to promote. One should always be wary of drawing
too much information from a single historical example, but Ghaffar Khan's Servants of God movement suggests both that the
Pashtun are not inherently violent and that the Pashtun prefer
their system of order to Western models. 73 We ought to conceptualize the West's role in reducing violence and improving the
treatment of women as facilitating the emergence of the Pashtun's internal goals for change rather than imposing them from
the outside.

69 Easwaran, A Man to Match is Mountainsat 112 (cited in note 48). In fact, while
no Servants of God committed acts of violence to serve their goals, several committed
suicide when the pressure of British oppression was too great. See Bennett, Arab-Muslim
Cases ofNon violent Struggle in Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim, eds, Arab Non violent Political
Struggle in the Middle East at 44 (cited in note 62).
70 See Johansen, 34 J Peace Res at 59 (cited in note 54).
71 Chand, India, Pakistanand Afghanistan at 50 (cited in note 49).
72 Johansen, 34 J Peace Res at 60 (cited in note 54).
7 See Johnson and Mason, 32 Intl Sec at 61 (cited in note 2).

